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Short sequences of improvement moves lead to approximate
equilibria in constraint satisfaction games
Ioannis Caragiannis∗ Angelo Fanelli† Nick Gravin‡
Abstract
We present an algorithm that computes approximate pure Nash equilibria in a broad class of
constraint satisfaction games that generalize the well-known cut and party affiliation games. Our
results improve previous ones by Bhalgat et al. (EC 10) in terms of the obtained approximation
guarantee. More importantly, our algorithm identifies a polynomially-long sequence of improvement
moves from any initial state to an approximate equilibrium in these games. The existence of such
short sequences is an interesting structural property which, to the best of our knowledge, was not
known before. Our techniques adapt and extend our previous work for congestion games (FOCS 11)
but the current analysis is considerably simpler.
Keywords: algorithmic game theory, complexity of equilibria, pure Nash equilibrium, potential
games, constraint satisfaction
1 Introduction
Constraint satisfaction games are generalizations of the well-known cut games and party affiliation
games. In a constraint satisfaction game, there is a set of boolean variables and a set of weighted con-
straints; each constraint depends on some of these variables. Each player controls the value of a distinct
variable and has two possible strategies: setting the value of the variable to either 0 (false) or 1 (true).
The payoff (or utility) of a player is the total weight in satisfied constraints where her variable appears.
Constraint satisfaction games are potential games. The total weight of satisfied constraints serves as an
exact potential function in the sense that the difference in the potential between two states that differ in
the strategy of a single player equals the change in the utility of that player. Hence, pure Nash equilibria
(i.e., states in which no player has an incentive to unilaterally move in order to improve her utility) can
be computed by solving the local search problem (see [14] for a theoretical treatment of local search)
of computing a local maximum of the potential function. Unfortunately, this is a computationally-hard
problem [19]. In this paper, we resort to the question of whether relaxed solution concepts — namely,
approximate (pure Nash) equilibria — can be computed efficiently.
In particular, we consider constraint satisfaction games where each constraint depends on the value
of at most k variables and has the property that its value can change from false to true by a unilateral
change in any of its variables. In general, we refer to such games as Pk–FLIP games following the
terminology of Bhalgat et al. [3]. Particular examples of this type of constraints include “parity” and
“not–all–equal” constraints. An odd (respectively, even) parity constraint requires that the number of its
true variables is odd (respectively, even). A not-all-equal constraint consists of literals (i.e., variables
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or their negations) and requires that at least two of its literals have different values. We refer to Pk–
FLIP games consisting of parity constraints as PARITY–k–FLIP games; Pk–FLIP games with not–all–
equal constraints with at least k¯ literals are called NAE–(k¯, k)–FLIP games. Party affiliation games are
PARITY–2–FLIP games and, in particular, cut games are PARITY–2–FLIP games with odd constraints or
NAE–(2, 2)–FLIP games whose constraints have no negative literals.
By adapting and extending our techniques in [4] for congestion games, we present a polynomial-
time algorithm that computes approximate equilibria in Pk–FLIP games. The approximation guarantee
is related to the stretch θ of the potential function of games in a given class, defined as the maximum
over all games in the class of the maximum ratio between the potential values in two equilibria. As we
show, Pk–FLIP games have a stretch of k + 1; hence, for general Pk–FLIP games, the approximation
guarantee θ + ε of our algorithm improves a previous one of 2k − 1 + ε by Bhalgat et al. [3] for k ≥ 3.
By bounding the stretch of NAE–(k¯, k)–FLIP and PARITY–k–FLIP games, we are able to show further
improvements. For NAE–(k¯, k)–FLIP games, the approximation guarantee becomes 3 + ε for k¯ = 2
and 2 + ε for k¯ ≥ 3; these results improve a bound of 2k¯
k¯−1
+ ε from [3]. For PARITY–k–FLIP games
with odd k, the approximation guarantee is k + ε. The running time of the algorithm is bounded by a
polynomial of the number of players, k, and 1/ε. Our analysis follows the same general structure of [4]
but uses different technical arguments and is considerably simpler due to the simplicity in the definition
of Pk–FLIP games.
More importantly, for every initial state of the game, our algorithm identifies a polynomially-long
sequence of improvement moves of the players that lead to an approximate equilibrium. The existence
of such short sequence suggests an interesting structural property of Pk–FLIP games which, to the best
of our knowledge, was not known before. Actually, Bhalgat et al. [3] argue about the limitations of (un-
coordinated) improvement move sequences by presenting a particular cut game in which any sequence
of ρ-moves (i.e., moves that improve the utility of the moving player by a factor of at least ρ) from some
states to any ρ–approximate equilibrium has exponential length for any ρ ∈ [1, 21/20). This negative
result complements nicely with the structural property we prove.
Our algorithm is simple. Players are classified into blocks so that the players within the same block
have polynomially-related maximum utility (i.e., total weight of the constraints a player can affect).
Then, a set of phases is executed. In each phase the players in two consecutive blocks are allowed to
move. The players in the block of higher maximum utility are allowed to make p-moves and the players
of the other block are allowed to make q-moves. Then, the strategies of the players that were allowed to
perform p-moves within a phase are irrevocably decided at its end. Clearly, this defines a sequence of
improvement moves by the players. We show that by setting the parameters q and p appropriately, the
algorithm terminates in polynomial time and, furthermore, the players whose strategies are irrevocably
decided at the end of a phase will not be affected significantly by later moves. In order to do so, we
select a value for parameter p that is slightly higher than the stretch of the class of games to which the
input game belongs and a value for parameter q that is very close to 1.
Related work. Scha¨ffer and Yannakakis [19] proved that the problem of computing a pure Nash equi-
librium in constraint satisfaction games is complete for the class PLS — standing for polynomial local
search — that has been introduced by Johnson et al. [11]. The negative result of [19] covers all games
considered in the current work and have been strengthened in [12, 13] to capture instances in which each
player participates in a constant number of constraints. Among the few rare non-trivial positive results
is an algorithm by Poljac [17] who shows that a local maximum of the potential function in cut games
can be computed in polynomial time when each player participates in at most three constraints.
The algorithm of [3] for approximate equilibria in Pk–FLIP games has the following structure. Play-
ers are partitioned into layers in a similar way to the block partitioning that we use in the current paper.
Then, a rearrangement phase moves players across blocks in order to guarantee that the total weight of
constraints, in which a player i participates together only with players in the same block or ones having
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lower maximum utility, is at least 1/k of player i’s maximum utility. This can be done in such a way that,
eventually, each layer contains players with polynomially-related maximum utility. Then, a top-down
layer dynamics phase takes place, where players within each layer play (1 + ε/k)-moves in a restricted
game among them until they reach an (1 + ε/k)–approximate equilibrium in this restricted game. The
authors of [3] show that the state computed in this way is a (2k − 1 + ε)–approximate equilibrium for
the original game. They also present a variation of their algorithm for NAE–(k¯, k)–FLIP games that
computes ( 2k¯
k¯−1
+ ε)–approximate equilibria. As the authors of [3] emphasize, in general, the moves
during the top-down layer dynamics phase are not improvement moves in the original game. In contrast,
our algorithm consists only of improvement moves.
Another class of potential games where the problem of computing an (approximate) equilibrium has
received a lot of attention is that of congestion games. A classical potential function for these games
has been defined by Rosenthal [18]. Fabrikant et al. [8] prove that computing a local minimum of this
function (corresponding to a pure Nash equilibrium) is PLS-hard as well. Even worse, for sufficiently
general congestion games, Skopalik and Voecking [20] show that computing a ρ–approximate equilib-
rium is PLS-hard for every reasonable (i.e., polynomially-computable) value of ρ. In our previous work,
we have presented an algorithm to compute O(1)-approximate equilibria for congestion games under
mild assumptions for the structure of the game. The current paper adapts and extends the main algo-
rithmic techniques in that paper, which have also been applied to (non-potential) weighted variants of
congestion games in [5]. Exact or almost exact equilibria can be computed in several special cases (e.g.,
see [6, 8]).
We remark that, even though it is hard to compute exactly, a local optimum of a potential function can
be approximated with extremely low precision under very mild assumptions [15]. This does not imply
that equilibria can be approximated with a similar precision, as the negative results of [20] show. Also,
uncoordinated move sequences have been shown to reach states of high social value quickly [1, 2, 7],
i.e., to states with low potential in the case of Pk–FLIP games. Unfortunately, these states are not
approximate equilibria either, since some player typically has a high incentive to move.
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin with preliminary definitions in
Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to our upper bounds on the stretch of Pk–FLIP games. The algorithm
and the statement of our main result are presented in Section 4 and the analysis follows in Section 5. We
conclude with open problems in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
A constraint satisfaction game consists of a set N of n players, a set of at least n boolean variables
V = {s1, s2, ..., s|V |}, and a set C of constraints (henceforth called clauses) over the variables in V .
Each clause c ∈ C has a non-negative weight wc. Player j ∈ N controls the value of a distinct variable
sj from V and has two possible strategies: setting the value of sj to either 0 (false), or 1 (true). The
variables of V that are not controlled by any player (if any) are frozen to certain boolean values. A state
S of the game is simply a snapshot of variable values (or a snapshot of players strategies complemented
with the fixed values of the frozen variables), i.e., S = (s1, s2, ..., s|V |). Given a state S of the game, we
denote by SAT (S) the set of satisfied clauses. For a subset of players R ⊆ N , we denote by SATR(S)
the subset of SAT (S) that consists of clauses in which the variable of some player from R appears.
With some abuse of notation, we simplify SAT{j}(S) to SATj(S). The utility of a player j is the total
weight of the true clauses in which her variable appears, i.e., uj(S) =
∑
c∈SATj(S)
wc. We also denote
by CR the set of clauses in which at least one player of R participates and simplify C{j} to Cj . We use
Uj to denote the maximum possible utility that player j might have, i.e., Uj =
∑
c∈Cj
wc.
Given a state S = (s1, s2, ..., s|V |) and a player j, we denote by (S−j , s′j) the state obtained from S
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when player j unilaterally changes her strategy. This is an improvement move (or simply, a move) for
player j if her utility increases, i.e., uj(S−j , s′j) > uj(S). We call it a ρ–move when the utility increases
by more than a factor of ρ, i.e., uj(S−j, s′j) > ρ · uj(S). A state S is a pure Nash equilibrium (or
simply, an equilibrium) if no player has a move to make. Similarly, S is a ρ–approximate (pure Nash)
equilibrium if no player has a ρ-move.
We specifically consider clauses with the following property: any false clause can become true by
changing the value of any of its variables. We will refer to games with clauses satisfying this property
and with at most k variables per clause as Pk–FLIP games. This class is broad enough and contains
(generalizations of) several well-studied games such as cut games and party affiliation games. We are
particularly interested in two subclasses of Pk–FLIP games. A NAE-clause contains literals (i.e., vari-
ables or their negations) and equals 1 if and only if there are two literals with different values. We will
refer to games consisting of NAE-clauses with at least k¯ ≥ 2 and most k literals as NAE–(k¯, k)–FLIP
games. Observe that these games are Pk–FLIP games since changing the value of any variable that ap-
pears in a clause can change the value of the clause from 0 to 1. In PARITY–k–FLIP games, each clause
is characterized as odd or even; an odd (respectively, even) clause is true if the number of its variables
which are 1 is odd (respectively, even). An important property of Pk–FLIP games is that for any state S
and any player j, it holds that Uj ≤ uj(S) + uj(S−j , s′j).
Given a state S of a Pk–FLIP game, we denote by Φ(S) the total weight of all true clauses, i.e.,
Φ(S) =
∑
c∈SATN (S)
wc. The function Φ is a potential function for this game. In particular, it has the
remarkable property that for every two states S and (S−j, s′j) differing only in the strategy of player j,
the difference of the potential is equal to the difference of the utility of player j, i.e., Φ(S)−Φ(S−j, s′j) =
uj(S)− uj(S−j, s
′
j).
In the following, we will be often considering sequences of moves in which only players in a certain
subset R ⊆ N are allowed to move. We can view such moves as moves in a subgame among the
players in R, with the set of clauses CR (each clause in CR has the same weight as in the original
game), and with fixed values for the variables that are not controlled by players in R. Observe that any
subgame of a Pk–FLIP game is a Pk–FLIP game as well. Similarly, any subgame of a NAE–(k¯, k)–FLIP
(respectively, PARITY–k–FLIP) game is a NAE–(k¯, k)–FLIP (respectively, PARITY–k–FLIP) game as
well. The function ΦR(S) =
∑
c∈SATR(S)
wc is an exact potential function for the subgame among the
players in R. The next claim follows easily by the definitions.
Claim 2.1 For every state S of a Pk–FLIP game and any set of players R ⊆ N , it holds that ΦR(S) ≤∑
j∈R uj(S) ≤ kΦR(S). Furthermore, for every set of players R′ ⊆ R, it holds that ΦR′(S) ≤ ΦR(S).
Proof. The first inequality follows since every clause that contributes to the sum
∑
c∈SATR(S)
wc (which
is equal to ΦR(S)) contributes at least once and at most k times to the sum
∑
j∈R
∑
c∈SATj(S)
wc (which
is equal to
∑
j∈R uj(S)). The second one follows trivially since SATR′(S) ⊆ SATR(S). ⊓⊔
3 The stretch of Pk–FLIP games
The approximation guarantee of our algorithm depends on a quantity related to the potential function of
Pk–FLIP games that we call the stretch.
Definition 3.1 Given η ≥ 0, the (1 + η)-stretch of a Pk–FLIP game is the ratio between the maximum
and the minimum value of the potential function taken over all (1+η)-approximate pure Nash equilibria
of the game.
We use the term stretch as a synonym of 1-stretch; observe that it is simply the ratio between the
maximum and minimum potentials of (exact) equilibria. In Theorem 3.1, we present upper bounds on
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the (1 + η)–stretch of Pk–FLIP games. Note that these bounds may be of independent interest; bounds
on the stretch of congestion games from our previous work [4] have been used by Piliouras et al. [16]
in order to quantify the price of anarchy of congestion games in settings with uncertainty where players
have particular risk attitudes.
Theorem 3.1 For any η > 0, the (1 + η)–stretch of Pk–FLIP games, NAE–(3, k)–FLIP games, NAE–
(2, k)–FLIP games, and PARITY–k–FLIP games with odd k is at most k + 1 + kη, 2 + kη, 3 + kη, and
k + kη, respectively.
Proof. Consider a Pk–FLIP (sub)game among players in a set R and with a set of clauses CR. Consider
an (1 + η)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium S and let S∗ be a state that maximizes the potential
function. Clearly, this state is an (1 + η)–approximate equilibrium for every η ≥ 0. Let D ⊆ R be
the set of players that use different strategies in S and S∗. We denote by Ci ⊆ CR the set of clauses
that contain exactly i players from D for i = 0, 1, ..., k. We use Cij to denote the subset of Ci in which
player j participates. Let SAT iR(S) = SATR(S) ∩ Ci. Also, denote by Λj(S) the subset of SATj(S)
consisting of the clauses that would become false by changing the strategy of player j ∈ D (to her
strategy in S∗). Let λc(S) = |{j ∈ D : c ∈ Λj(S)}| and λ = maxc∈CR λc(S).
Since every player j in D has no (1 + η)-move in state S, we have (1 + η) · uj(S) ≥ uj(S−j , s′j)
and, equivalently,
(1 + η) ·
∑
c∈SATj(S)
wc ≥
∑
c∈Cj\Λj(S)
wc.
By adding
∑
c∈Λ(j)wc to both sides, we get
(1 + η) ·
∑
c∈SATj(S)
wc +
∑
c∈Λj(S)
wc ≥
∑
c∈Cj
wc.
By summing over all players in D, we obtain that∑
i∈[k]
∑
c∈SAT i
R
(S)
(i+ iη + λc(S))wc ≥
∑
i∈[k]
∑
c∈Ci
iwc, (1)
where [k] denotes the set of integers {1, 2, ..., k}.
Now, the potential of state S∗ is not higher than the total weight of all clauses in CR \ C0 plus the
weight in satisfied clauses of C0 (these clauses are satisfied in both states S and S∗). Hence,
Φ(S∗) ≤
∑
c∈CR\C0
wc +
∑
c∈SAT 0
R
(S)
wc
=
∑
i∈[k]
∑
c∈Ci
iwc −
∑
i∈[k]
∑
c∈Ci
(i− 1)wc +
∑
c∈SAT 0
R
(S)
wc
≤
∑
i∈[k]
∑
c∈SAT i
R
(S)
(i+ iη + λc(S))wc −
∑
i∈[k]
∑
c∈SAT i
R
(S)
(i− 1)wc +
∑
c∈SAT 0
R
(S)
wc
=
∑
i∈[k]
∑
c∈SAT i
R
(S)
(λc(S) + 1 + iη)wc +
∑
c∈SAT 0
R
(S)
wc
≤ (λ+ 1 + kη) ·
k∑
i=0
∑
c∈SAT i
R
(S)
wc
= (λ+ 1 + kη) ·
∑
c∈SATR(S)
wc
= (λ+ 1 + kη) · Φ(S).
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The second inequality in the above derivation follows from (1) and from the observation that SAT iR ⊆
Ci for every i ∈ [k]. The last inequality follows by the definition of λ. Now, for general Pk–FLIP games,
the theorem is obvious since λ ≤ k.
In order to prove the next two statements, we need an additional simple observation. For any true
clause c that is a NAE-clause with at least three literals, c can become false by an unilateral change in at
most one variable (i.e., λc(S) ≤ 1 and, consequently, λ ≤ 1). A true NAE-clause with two literals can
become false by a unilateral change in any of its two variables (hence, λ ≤ 2).
Finally, in order to prove the bound on the stretch of PARITY–k–FLIP games with odd k, we first
observe that a clause of SAT kR(S) is not satisfied in S∗, since changing k (an odd number) variables
changes the parity of the whole Parity clause. Hence, we can repeat the last derivation starting with the
stronger bound ΦR(S∗) ≤
∑
c∈CR\SAT
k
R
(S) wc and obtain the improved upper bound of (λ+kη)·ΦR(S)
on ΦR(S
∗). ⊓⊔
The bounds in Theorem 3.1 are tight; we show this for η = 0 with four examples. First, let k ≥ 2 and
consider the a unit-weight clause with the variables x1, x2, ..., xk that is true if and only if the number of
variables with value 1 is either zero or has the same parity with k (it can be easily seen that this constraint
satisfies the property required by Pk–FLIP games). There are k additional even clauses, each containing
only the variable xi for i = 1, ..., k. The state in which all players play 1 is an equilibrium with potential
1 while the state in which all players play 0 has potential k + 1. Second, consider the NAE–(3, 3)–FLIP
game with two players controlling the values of the variables x and y and two unit-weight NAE-clauses
c1 = (0, x, y) and c2 = (y, 1, 1). The state in which the players play x = 0 and y = 1 is an equilibrium
with potential 1 while the state with x = 1 and y = 0 has potential 2. Third, consider the 2-player
NAE–(2, k)–FLIP game with the three unit-weight clauses c1 = (0, x), c2 = (x, y), and c3 = (y, 1).
The state in which the players play x = 0 and y = 1 is an equilibrium with potential 1 while the state
with x = 1 and y = 0 has potential 3. Finally, for odd k, consider the (k − 1)-player PARITY–k–FLIP
game with a unit-weight even clause c = (x1, x2, ..., xk−1, 0) and k − 1 additional unit-weight odd
clauses, each containing only the variable xi for i = 1, ..., k − 1. The state in which all players play 0 is
an equilibrium with potential 1 while the state in which all players play 1 has potential k.
In the following, we use the notation θ(1 + η) to denote our upper bound on the (1 + η)-stretch of
Pk–FLIP games (and clarify when we refer to the stretch of particular subclasses of Pk–FLIP games).
We use simply θ to denote the upper bound on the 1-stretch.
4 The algorithm
The pseudocode of our algorithm appears below as Algorithm 1. We supplement this formal description
with a detailed line–by–line explanation.
The algorithm takes as input a Pk–FLIP game G with n players, an initial state Sin, and an accuracy
parameter ε ∈ (0, 1]. Starting from state Sin, it identifies a sequence of moves that lead to a state Sout;
this is the output of the algorithm. As we will prove later, Sout is an approximate equilibrium. The
algorithm starts (lines 1 and 2) by setting the values of parameters q and p. Parameter q has a value very
close to 1 (namely, q = 1 + ε3k ) and parameter p has a value slightly higher than the q-stretch of the
class to which the input game belongs (namely, p = θ(q) + ε/3). In particular, using our upper bounds
on θ(q) from Theorem 3.1, p is set to be k + 1 + 2ε/3 in general, 2 + 2ε/3 if G is a NAE–(3, k)–FLIP
game, 3 + 2ε/3 if it is a NAE–(2, k)–FLIP games, and k + 2ε/3 if it is a PARITY–k game and k is odd.
The algorithm also sets the value of parameter ∆ to be a polynomial depending on n, k, p, and 1/ε (line
3). Then (lines 4-5), it implicitly partitions the players into blocks B1, B2, ..., Bm according to their
maximum utility. Denoting by Umax the maximum values among all players’ maximum utilities, block
Bi consists of the players j with maximum utility Uj ∈ (Umax∆−i, Umax∆1−i]. By the definition of ∆,
the players in the same block have polynomially related maximum utilities.
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Input : A Pk–FLIP game G with a set N of n players, an arbitrary initial state Sin, and
ε ∈ (0, 1]
Output: A state Sout of G
1 q ← 1 + ε3k ;
2 p← θ(q) + ε/3;
3 ∆ = 200p3nk/ε2;
4 Set Umin ← minj∈N Uj , Umax ← maxj∈N Uj , and m← 1 + ⌊log∆ (Umax/Umin)⌋;
5 (Implicitly) partition players into blocks B1, B2, . . . , Bm, such that j ∈ Bi implies that
Uj ∈
(
Umax∆
−i, Umax∆
1−i
]
;
6 S ← Sin;
7 while there exists a player j ∈ B1 such that uj(S−j, s′j) > q · uj(S) do
8 S ← (S−j , s
′
j);
9 end
10 for phase i← 1 to m− 1 such that Bi 6= ∅ do
11 while there exists a player j that either belongs to Bi and satisfies
uj(S−j , s
′
j) > p · uj(S) or belongs to Bi+1 and satisfies uj(S−j , s′j) > q · uj(S) do
12 S ← (S−j, s
′
j);
13 end
14 end
15 Sout ← S;
Algorithm 1: Computing approximate equilibria in Pk–FLIP games.
The sequence of moves from state Sin to state Sout is computed by the code in the lines 6-15. The
subsequence of moves described in lines 7-9 constitutes phase 0. During phase 0, the players in block
B1 make q-moves. After that, each phase i for i ≥ 1 consists of p-moves of players in block Bi and
q-moves of players in block Bi+1. Strategies of players in block Bi are irrevocably decided at the end
of phase i.
We are ready to state our main result which we will prove in the next section.
Theorem 4.1 On input a Pk–FLIP game G with n players, an initial state Sin, and ε ∈ (0, 1], Algorithm
1 computes a sequence of at most poly(n, k, 1/e) moves that starts from Sin and converges to a (k+1+
ε)–approximate pure Nash equilibrium Sout. The approximation guarantee is at most 2+ ε when G is a
NAE–(3, k)–FLIP game, at most 3 + ε when it is a NAE–(2, k)–FLIP games, and at most k + ε when it
is a PARITY–k–FLIP game and k is odd.
5 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Before presenting the proof of Theorem 4.1, we give some intuition behind our analysis. The analysis
uses two properties that are formally stated in Lemma 5.1. What this lemma essentially says is that,
during each phase, the total utility of the moving players as well as an increase in the potential of the
subgame among these players are small. The first property is used in Lemma 5.3 to prove that, once the
strategy of a player is irrevocably decided, later phases may have only a negligible effect on her. And
since no player has a p-move to make at the end of the phase when her strategy is decided, she cannot
improve her utility by a factor of (almost) p until the end of the algorithm. Together with the fact that
each player’s move increases her utility by some non-negligible amount, the second property is used in
Lemma 5.4 to bound the total number of moves.
In our analysis, we denote by Si the state reached at the end of phase i ≥ 0, i.e., Sout = Sm−1.
We also denote by Ri the set of players that move during phase i. We also denote the upper boundary
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of block Bi by Wi and by Wm+1 the lower boundary of block Bm, i.e., Wi = Umax∆1−i for i =
1, 2, ...,m + 1. So, the players of block Bi are those with maximum utility Uj ∈ (Wi+1,Wi].
Lemma 5.1 For every phase i ≥ 1, it holds that
1.
∑
j∈Ri
Uj ≤ 10pknWi+1/ε
2. ΦRi(Si)− ΦRi(Si−1) ≤ 3p2nWi+1/ε.
Proof. First observe that players not in Ri have the same set of strategies in states Si−1 and Si.
Furthermore, the total weight of clauses depending on variables that are controlled by players from
Ri ∩ Bi+1 is at most nWi+1. Hence, by the definition of the subgame potential, we have that the
potential of the state (Si−1−Ri∩Bi , S
i
Ri∩Bi
) in which the players in Ri ∩Bi play their strategies in state Si
and the remaining players play their strategies in Si−1 satisfies
ΦRi∩Bi(S
i−1
−Ri∩Bi
, SiRi∩Bi) ≥ ΦRi(S
i)− nWi+1. (2)
We will use inequality (2) in the proof of the next claim that provides a bound on the potential ΦRi(Si−1)
as well as later in the current proof.
Claim 5.2 ΦRi(Si−1) ≤ 3pnWi+1/ε.
Proof. We assume on the contrary that ΦRi(Si−1) > 3pnWi+1/ε and we are going to conclude that the
potential of the state (Si−1−Ri∩Bi , S
i
Ri∩Bi
) satisfies ΦRi∩Bi(Si−1−Ri∩Bi , S
i
Ri∩Bi
) > θ(q) ·ΦRi∩Bi(S
i−1). By
Theorem 3.1, this would contradict the fact that Si−1 is the output of phase i − 1, i.e., a q-approximate
equilibrium of the subgame among the players in Ri ∩ Bi, since there is another q–approximate equi-
librium (the one that can be reached from (Si−1−Ri∩Bi , SiRi∩Bi) with q-moves by the players in Ri ∩ Bi)
with a potential that is higher than θ(q) times the potential at state Si−1.
We denote by ℓ(j) the utility of player j ∈ Ri ∩ Bi right after she makes her last move in phase i.
Then we have
ΦRi(S
i)− ΦRi(S
i−1) ≥ (1− 1/p) ·
∑
j∈Ri∩Bi
ℓ(j). (3)
Indeed, the last move of a player j ∈ Ri ∩ Bi increases her utility by a factor of at least p and the
difference ΦRi(Si)−ΦRi(Si−1) equals to the total increase in the utility of the deviating players within
the phase.
Furthermore, we claim that
∑
j∈Ri∩Bi
ℓ(j) + nWi+1 ≥ ΦRi(S
i). (4)
To see why (4) is true, observe that the right-hand side is the sum of the weights of the clauses in
SATRi(S
i). The term nWi+1 is an upper bound on the total weight of the clauses in SATRi∩Bi+1(Si).
The weight of each of the remaining ones (i.e., the clauses in SATRi(Si) \ SATRi∩Bi+1(Si)) is ac-
counted for at least once in the sum
∑
j∈Ri∩Bi
ℓ(j), as part of the utility of some player from Ri ∩ Bi
after her last move.
By (3) and (4) (i.e., by multiplying (3) by p and (4) by p− 1 and summing them), we obtain that
ΦRi(S
i) ≥ p · ΦRi(S
i−1)− (p− 1)nWi+1. (5)
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Hence, using (2), (5), the definition of p, and the second inequality of Claim 2.1, we obtain
ΦRi∩Bi(S
i−1
−Ri∩Bi
, SiRi∩Bi) ≥ ΦRi(S
i)− nWi+1
≥ p · ΦRi(S
i−1)− pnWi+1
> (p − ε/3) · ΦRi(S
i−1)
≥ θ(q) · ΦRi∩Bi(S
i−1).
We have obtained the desired contradiction. ⊓⊔
Using the observation that no player in Ri ∩Bi has a q-move to make at the end of phase i− 1 (i.e.,
at state Si−1) as well as the first inequality of Claim 2.1, we obtain that
∑
j∈Ri∩Bi
Uj ≤
∑
j∈Ri∩Bi
(
uj(S
i−1) + uj(S
i−1
−j , s
′
j)
)
≤
∑
j∈Ri∩Bi
(1 + q)uj(S
i−1)
≤ (1 + q)k · ΦRi∩Bi(S
i−1)
≤ 9pknWi+1/ε.
The proof of the first inequality in the statement of the lemma follows by observing that the total utility
of the players in Ri ∩Bi+1 is at most nWi+1.
In order to prove the second inequality we use inequality (2), the q-stretch bound for the subgame
among the players in Ri ∩Bi, the fact that θ(q) ≤ p, the second inequality of Claim 2.1, and the bound
on ΦRi(S
i−1) from Claim 5.2.
ΦRi(S
i)− ΦRi(S
i−1) ≤ ΦRi∩Bi(S
i−1
−Ri∩Bi
, SiRi∩Bi)−ΦRi(S
i−1) + nWi+1
≤ θ(q) · ΦRi∩Bi(S
i−1)− ΦRi(S
i−1) + nWi+1
≤ (p − 1) · ΦRi(S
i−1) + nWi+1
≤ 3p2nWi+1/ε.
⊓⊔
The first property of Lemma 5.1 indicates that the total weight of the moving players in phase i is
significantly smaller than the upper boundary of block Bi. In Lemma 5.3 we combine this with the fact
that the upper boundary of subsequent blocks decreases exponentially and formally prove that, after the
strategy of a player is irrevocably decided, subsequent phases may have only a negligible effect on her.
Recall that θ is the stretch of the class of games to which the input game belongs to and equals k + 1
for Pk–FLIP games, 3 for NAE–(2, k)–FLIP games, and 2 for NAE–(3, k)–FLIP games, and k − 1 for
PARITY–k–FLIP games with odd k.
Lemma 5.3 The state Sout is a (θ + ε)–approximate pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. By the definition of phase m − 1, the players in blocks Bm−1 and Bm have no p-move to
make at the end of phase m − 1. We will consider a player j belonging to block Bt whose strategy is
irrevocably decided at the end of phase t with t ≤ m− 2, and will show that she has no (p+ ε/3)-move
to make at the end of phase m − 1 (i.e., at state Sm−1 = Sout). The lemma will then follow since
p+ ε/3 = θ(1 + ε3k ) + 2ε/3 = θ + ε.
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Let sj be the strategy used by player j at the end of phase t. Using Lemma 5.1 and the definition of
the block boundaries, we can bound the quantity
∑m−1
i=t+1
∑
r∈Ri
Ur. Thus, we get an upper bound on
the total weight of clauses with players that move in phases t+ 1, ...,m − 1, as follows:
m−1∑
i=t+1
∑
r∈Ri
Ur ≤
m−1∑
i=t+1
10pnkWi+1/ε
≤
10pnkWt+1
ε
∞∑
i=1
∆−i
=
10pnkWt+1
ε(∆ − 1)
≤
Wt+1ε
10p2
. (6)
The last inequality follows by the definition of ∆ and the fact that ∆− 1 ≥ ∆/2.
Now observe that since player j has no p-move at the end of phase t (i.e., at state St), it holds that
uj(S
t) ≥ uj(S
t
−j, s
′
j)/p and Wt+1 ≤ uj(St) + uj(St−j, s′j) ≤ (1 + p)uj(St), i.e., uj(St) ≥
Wt+1
1+p .
Furthermore, during phases t + 1, ...,m − 1, the total change in the utility of player j or in the utility
player j would have by deviating is at most
∑m−1
i=t+1
∑
r∈Ri
Ur. Using these observations and inequality
(6), we have
uj(S
m−1) ≥ uj(S
t)−
m−1∑
i=t+1
∑
r∈Ri
Ur
≥
p
p+ ε/3
uj(S
t) +
ε/3
p+ ε/3
Wt+1
1 + p
−
m−1∑
i=t+1
∑
r∈Ri
Ur
≥
1
p+ ε/3
uj(S
t
−j, s
′
j) +
Wt+1ε
5p(p + ε/3)
−
m−1∑
i=t+1
∑
r∈Ri
Ur
≥
1
p+ ε/3
uj(S
m−1
−j , s
′
j) +
Wt+1ε
5p(p + ε/3)
−
(
1 +
1
p+ ε/3
) m−1∑
i=t+1
∑
r∈Ri
Ur
≥
1
p+ ε/3
uj(S
m−1
−j , s
′
j) +
Wt+1ε
5p(p + ε/3)
−
2p
p+ ε/3
m−1∑
i=t+1
∑
r∈Ri
Ur
≥
1
p+ ε/3
uj(S
m−1
−j , s
′
j),
as desired. In the third and fifth inequalities we have used the inequalities 3(1+p) ≤ 5p and p+1+ε/3 ≤
2p which follow since p ≥ 2 and ε ∈ (0, 1]. This completes the proof of the lemma. ⊓⊔
We conclude the proof of Theorem 4.1 by bounding the running time of the algorithm.
Lemma 5.4 On input of Pk–FLIP (in particular, NAE–(k¯, k)–FLIP) game, the algorithm identifies a
sequence of at most O(n3k7/ε4) (in particular, O(n3k2/ε4)) moves.
Proof. Consider a moving player j that belongs to block i and let u be her utility after she makes a
move. Since this is a move in a Pk–FLIP game, u ≥ Uj/2. Also, since it is at least an
(
1 + ε3k
)
-move
(and since k ≥ 2 and ε ∈ (0, 1]), the potential improves by at least u− u1+ ε
3k
≥
εUj
7k ≥
εWi+1
7k .
We will bound the total number of moves by bounding the number of moves in each phase sepa-
rately. Clearly, the increase in the potential during phase 0 is ΦR0(S0) − ΦR0(Sin) ≤ nW1. Hence,
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since only players in block B1 move during phase 0, it will end after at most nW1/
(
εW2
7k
)
= 7nk∆/ε =
1400p3k2n2/ε3 moves. For phase i ≥ 1, by Lemma 5.1, we have ΦRi(Si−1) − ΦRi(Si−1) ≤
3p2nWi+1/ε. Since the moving players during this phase belong to blocks Bi and Bi+1, the increase in
the potential during each move is at least εWi+27k . Hence, the total number of moves during the phase is
at most
(
3p2nWi+1/ε
)
/
(
εWi+2
7k
)
= 21p2nk∆/ε2 = 4200p5k2n2/ε4.
In total, since the number of the phases that are executed by the algorithm after phase 0 is at most n,
the number of moves is at most O(n3p5kn3/ε4) and the lemma follows since p ∈ O(k) in general and
p = O(1) in particular for NAE–(k¯, k)–FLIP games. ⊓⊔
6 Open problems
A challenging open problem is to improve the approximation guarantee of our algorithm. Our analysis
indicates that a state with lower stretch at the beginning of each phase would allow us to use an even
smaller value for parameter p and, subsequently, to obtain a better approximation guarantee. One idea
that comes immediately to mind is to replace the q-moves of the players of block Bi+1 within phase
i with the execution of an algorithm that computes states with approximately–optimal potential. For
example, a random assignment to players of Bi+1 would yield a 2-approximation to the potential of the
subgame among them. Furthermore, for more structured Pk–FLIP games such as cut games, one might
think to use the famous algorithm of [9] that is based on semi-definite programming. Unfortunately,
we do not see how to include these ideas into our algorithm at this point. The main difficulty is that
the low-stretch property should hold for the subgame among the players that will move during the next
phase which we do not know in advance. An algorithm that approximates the potential of all subgames
simultaneously would be ideal here but, besides the local search approach implied by the q-moves,
neither the random assignment nor the SDP-based algorithms satisfy this property.
Even if we could bypass these obstacle, our technique has limitations since computing states with
low-stretch in Pk–FLIP games includes famous hard-to-approximate problems (e.g., see [10]). So, in
order to compute almost exact equilibria, we need new techniques. Of course, we have no idea whether
this is at all possible. To put the question differently, is there some inapproximability threshold for
approximate equilibria? We remark that such negative statements are not known in the literature: the
only known negative results are either specific to exact equilibria (such as the PLS-hardness results of
[8, 19]) or rule out any reasonable approximation guarantee in games with very general structure (e.g.,
in [20]). We believe that such questions that are related to the computational complexity of approximate
pure Nash equilibria deserve further attention.
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